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Kant only mentions forgiveness explicitly in a few, short passages in the Lectures on Ethics and the “Doctrine of Virtue.” But these passages, along with independent observations about his moral theory, provide us with the information necessary to construct a Kantian account of forgiveness. In this paper I sketch such an account and argue that it is distinguished by three features. First, Kantian forgiveness is best understood as the revision of the actions one takes toward an offender, rather than a change of feeling toward an offender. Second, Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue tells us that we have two reasons to sometimes be forgiving: forgiveness promotes both our own moral perfection and the happiness of our moral community. Third, we have a duty to withhold forgiveness if with think forgiveness will cause or encourage our offender to wrong us again. This duty to sometimes withhold forgiveness stems from our duty of self-respect, which Kant repeatedly describes as a duty to ourselves to ensure that we are not harmed again. In what follows, I take each of these components in turn.
I. Remission of Compensation, not (Necessarily) a Change of Feeling
	In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant tells us that forgiveness is “the remission of compensation or payment.”​[1]​ Kant’s definition stands in decided contrast to one of the most famous and influential accounts of forgiveness, that of Joseph Butler, who argues in his Fifteen Sermons that forgiveness should be understood as the cessation of the feeling of resentment.​[2]​ In what follows, I present a taxonomy of the feelings that Kant associates with the recognition of wrongdoing and argue that – for different reasons – none of them is a candidate for revision on Kant’s account. Hence, a Kantian approach to forgiveness cannot be one that defines forgiveness as a change of feeling.
A. Indignation
	The first feeling that Kant associates with the recognition of wrongdoing is indignation. This feeling bears many of the hallmarks of what Kant calls a moral emotion. It is a feeling brought about by recognition of the moral law – in this case, the knowledge that someone has violated this law. As a moral emotion, indignation is consistent with our duty of apathy, or our obligation to keep pathological emotion from having an influence on moral choice.​[3]​ Indignation is not a selfish feeling: Kant claims that we often feel indignation on another person’s behalf. When we learn of injustice “we are indignant, and anxious to let the culprit know what it means to violate the rights of others.”​[4]​ 
Why not say, then, that Kantian forgiveness consists of a renunciation of the feeling of indignation? The problem with this strategy is that renouncing one’s feeling of indignation comes at the cost of revising one’s judgment that a wrong has been committed. To see how this is the case, it is useful to compare indignation to Kant’s most famous example of moral feeling, the feeling of respect that arises from our recognition of the law’s bindingness. Once we have recognized this fact of bindingness, it seems difficult to explain how we might revise our feeling of respect without changing our mind about its source.​[5]​  Analogously, we may cease to feel indignant if we realize that an offence was just an accident, or that the offender could not help what he had done. But, as Pamela Hieronymi has correctly argued, this is not forgiveness.​[6]​ In order to forgive, rather than simply excuse, we must hold firm the conviction that a serious moral offense has occurred. If we revise our feeling of indignation by revising this belief, we are excusing, but not forgiving.
B. Anger and Vengeance
There are two further Kantian emotions associated with the recognition of wrongdoing. Unlike indignation, however, these emotions are pathological feelings that violate our duty of apathy. The first of these emotions is anger, a feeling that Kant consistently uses as an example of a so-called ‘affect’. Affects are distinguished from more insidious ‘passions’ (an example of which we see below) by the fact that they are short-lived feelings that “[make] reflection impossible” rather than deeply ingrained inclinations that have grafted themselves on to our reason.​[7]​ 
The feeling of vengeance, on the other hand, is a passion that is characterized by a wishing of pain and evil upon an offender that goes beyond the pain and evil necessary to defend our rights.​[8]​ This type of feeling, Kant says, is clearly “contrary to our duty of humanity and can only be conceived under a presupposition of hatred toward men.”​[9]​ For this reason, both vengeance and hatred violate our duty to wish for the well being of others.​[10]​
There are at least two reasons that Kantian forgiveness cannot consist of a revision of anger or vengeance. First, Kantian agents actually have an obligation to avoid these feelings. In the case of anger, this obligation stems from the fact that this type of affect makes us temporarily unable to reason morally.​[11]​ Our obligation to avoid vengeance stems from the fact that this passion violates our duty of beneficence. Thus, if forgiveness consisted of a revision of these emotions, we would have a duty to forgive all the time, or as much as possible. But there are two problems with such a claim. First, it doesn’t seem to correspond with our sense that forgiveness is something that is gift-like, or that it is something we grant by choice.​[12]​ Second, it runs counter to Kant’s claims that forgiveness should actually be withheld in cases in which we think this is necessary to preserve our self-respect. 
Furthermore, if forgiveness consisted of the revision of anger or vengeance, it would make little sense for Kant to say – as he does – that we sometimes have a duty to forgive. This is because Kant thinks that we have little or no control over these feelings. Anger, he thinks, tends to come upon us rather quickly (and often dissipates just as quickly).​[13]​ And though a passion like vengeance usually stems from a series of decisions to allow inclination to be a part of our maxim, once it has gotten a foothold in our reasoning we have little ability to renounce or revise this feeling. A claim that we have a duty to revise such feelings would thus be a claim that we ought to do something we cannot do.
D. How to Understand the ‘Remission of Compensation’
This overview of the emotions associated with the recognition of wrongdoing demonstrates that Kant cannot define forgiveness as the revision of one’s feelings toward an offender. Rather, forgiveness can only consist of revising the kinds of actions we take toward our offender. Specifically, as Kant puts it, forgiveness consists of the remission of compensation for a wrongdoing. But how are we to understand Kant’s ideas of compensation and remission?
	It is crucial to remember that, in the discussion of interpersonal wrongdoing and forgiveness, we are concerned only with moral punishment, not civic punishment.​[14]​ Kant tells us that, in the moral sense, punishment consists of the actions we undertake in order to be either materially restored, or to have our rights restored (or, presumably, both). This seeking of compensation is both a right and sometimes a duty.​[15]​ Though Kant gives few examples, the ways that we seek compensation can, I think, be understood quite broadly. Especially when it comes to seeking the reinstatement of our rights, punishment might consist of anything from a public campaign to giving someone the cold shoulder. The remission of such compensation – or forgiveness – consists, then, in ceasing these activities.​[16]​
II. Forgiveness as a Duty of Virtue
Seeking compensation is, according to Kant, a right. But, Kant also claims that forgiveness is a “duty of virtue,” insofar as this is consistent with self-respect.​[17]​ And, in asserting that forgiveness is a duty of virtue, Kant provides important information about the reasons that we have for forgiveness. Interestingly, Kantian reasons for forgiveness have very little to do with the relationship between victim and offender. Rather, when Kantian agents choose to forgive, they do so for the sake of their own moral perfection, or for the sake of the happiness of their community. In what follows, I examine Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue and demonstrate how it provides these reasons for forgiveness.
We may at first be tempted to think that Kant thinks of forgiveness as a duty of virtue (as opposed to a duty of right) because it cannot be coerced. Forgiveness doesn’t appear to be the kind of thing that can be wrung from us with the threat of punishment or hope of reward. But, if what I have argued in the first section is correct, this assumption may be too quick. If forgiveness has to do with the external actions that we take toward an offender, it seems these can be (though they are usually not) externally coerced. (If this seems implausible, simply imagine the primary school teacher who coerces feuding students to ‘play nicely’ or share toys.)
 Of course, many of the external actions associated with duties of virtue could be coerced. A person can be easily coerced (by way of tax-law, for example) into writing a check to a charity. But this does not impugn beneficence as a duty of virtue. This is for the simple reason that beneficence is not constituted by the act of writing a check, but rather by the end that the beneficent person adopts. The notion of adopting an end, then, is where I suggest we turn in order to understand Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue. And Kant tells us that there are two ends that we can promote by fulfilling duties of virtue – the end of our own moral perfection, and that of the happiness of others.
The first possibility, then, is that in forgiving a wrongdoer, we are actually promoting the end of our own moral perfection. Counterintuitive as this may seem, there is certainly room in Kant’s theory for this interpretation. Kant often suggests that the external actions we take can have an impact on the emotions (and, by extension, inclinations) that we tend to feel. So, for example, Kant tells us that performing beneficent actions will “produce” in us a “love” of our neighbor.​[18]​ Analogously, he says that we should avoid voicing negative judgments about others because this tends to “cast a shadow of worthlessness” across humanity and makes misanthropy “the prevalent cast of mind.”​[19]​ Thus, following Kant’s psychological assumptions, we might posit that in ceasing to seek compensation (when this is consistent with self-respect), we also develop a character that is more likely to love others and adopt the ends of others as its own.​[20]​
 The second possibility, of course, is that forgiveness is a duty of virtue that promotes the happiness of others. This, too, is a plausible reading of Kant’s claim, though we should proceed carefully in determining whose happiness we are promoting. The first possibility is that in forgiving we are promoting the happiness of the offender. But recall that forgiveness, on Kant’s account, is the remission of compensation or payment. In other words, when I forgive someone, I am by definition forgiving a person who has not made a full payment (material or otherwise) for his wrongdoing. And this often – if not always – means that when we forgive, we are promoting the happiness of a person who is not worthy of happiness. Now, of course, all of us are morally imperfect and so, in some sense unworthy of happiness. This fact alone should not keep us from adopting the happiness of others as our end. But in the case of forgiveness, the scenario is importantly different. The happiness that an offender receives from a victim’s forgiveness can often be happiness that is achieved as a result of the wrongdoing and at the expense of the victim. If, to take a simple example, you steal a bushel of apples from me, and, instead of seeking compensation, I choose to forgive you, then you might very naturally be able to accomplish your ends more easily – and some of those ends might include eating my apples. 
So, while it is not impossible to think of forgiveness as contributing to the happiness of an offender, it is wise to take a broader view of the happiness that we are promoting when we forgive. Specifically, it is more plausible to suggest that the happiness we are promoting is that of the whole community. To be sure, we want to live in a community where our rights are respected and defended when necessary. But it is also easier for individuals in a community to pursue their ends when resources are not being devoted, so to speak, to seeking compensation. Examples range from the simple and everyday – a child who doesn’t receive attention from arguing parents – to the global-political. A political or ethnic group may, for example, choose to stop seeking compensation because this endeavor is detracting from a younger generation’s ability to lead a life in which one’s ends can be pursued fully.​[21]​ 
Having seen how we might justify Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue, we are also in a position to articulate a crucial piece of information – the reasons we have for forgiveness. Knowing and appealing to these reasons is a crucial component of any account of forgiveness, and is necessary if we are to maintain our self-respect in forgiving. Below, I discuss the condition of self-respect in more detail, but as a preface to this discussion, I think it is clear that the ability to articulate reasons for forgiveness is a minimal condition for preserving self-respect. If I simply forgive my offenders on a whim, or for no good reason, it seems I am sacrificing my own standing too soon.​[22]​
III. Forgiveness and Self-Respect
While providing a reason for our forgiveness seems a necessary condition for maintaining self-respect, it is not a sufficient condition. In this section, I argue that, for Kant, maintaining one’s self-respect while forgiving requires that we make sure (to the extent possible) that our forgiveness will not cause or allow an offender to harm us again. 
Kant frequently associates self-respect with the idea that we should not allow ourselves to be harmed or offended, especially if we have some previous indication that a person is likely to harm us. For example, in the “Doctrine of Virtue,” Kant tells us that forgiveness is not consistent with – and should not be confused with – the “meek toleration of wrongs.”​[23]​ Kant then defines this “meek toleration” as the “renunciation of rigorous means for preventing the recurrence of wrongs.”​[24]​ Thus, it seems, the moral punishment that we mete out can have two functions: first, it encourages or compels the offender to make us whole, either through apology or through material restitution. And second, it sometimes serves as a way of preventing a person from violating our rights a second time. In short, then, Kant’s claim that forgiveness should be consistent with self-respect means that we should not forgive if we think that such forgiveness would encourage a repeat offense.
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that ‘punishment’ and taking ‘rigorous means’ for preventing repeated wrongdoing are not in every case co-extensive. That is, it is possible in some cases to cease one’s punishment of a wrongdoer and still take measures to ensure that one is not wronged again. For example, if you promise to take me to a baseball game on Friday and then break that promise, I can forgive you by ceasing to seek an apology or rain check. But in order to maintain my self-respect, I should perhaps not believe you when you say that you have tickets for next Saturday.
 But there are other cases in which seeking compensation and taking rigorous means to prevent future wrongdoings do not come apart so easily. These are cases in which a victim’s forgiveness would send the message to the offender that the victim is not worthy of respect. Often, this will have to do with a set of false beliefs on the part of the offender; forgiveness may in such cases confirm the offender’s suspicions that his victim is not worthy of respect. Indeed, Kant suggests that in order to guard against this kind of scenario, “the offender must be got to the point of acknowledging his injustice.”​[25]​ If an offender cannot acknowledge his injustice, it is likely that the act of forgiveness might actually make a repeat offense more likely. And, in cases like these, the victim has an obligation, stemming from his duty of self-respect, to withhold forgiveness.​[26]​
IV. Conclusion
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